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PROTECTION OF UNDERGROUND DRINKING WATER
SUPPLIES-THE GONZALEZ AMENDMENT TO THE
SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT
SEAGAL V. WHEATLEY*
ROLAND CASTANEDA**

On December 17, 1974, President Gerald R. Ford signed into law the
Safe Drinking Water Act."9 The Act for the first time establishes a
timetable for the establishment of national drinking water standards.
Through provisions of this Act, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) will begin the task of systematically defining and identifying the
actual extent and severity of ground water contamination and will, in
approximately one to two years, adopt appropriate National Primary
Drinking Water Standards (NPDWS). These standards will define the
maximum permissible contamination levels for a score of identifiable
contaminants found in our nation's water supply. In turn, these maximum contaminant levels will be use4 by selected state agencies to
execute their primary enforcement responsibilities under the regulatory
provisions of the new Act.
Congress enacted the Safe Drinking Water Act in order to assure that
public water systems complied with minimum water quality standards
necessary to protect the public health."0 Existing federal drinking water
standards promulgated in 1962 under the 1893 Quarantine Act were
deemed to be inadequate by Congress because, among other reasons,
existing federal standards were interpreted by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare as permitting the enforcement of standards only
with respect to contaminants which caused communicable diseases. The
Safe Drinking Water Act establishes federal standards for protection
from all harmful contaminants of every conceivable nature, and the
standards are applicable to all public water systems serving the public.
* Seagal V. Wheatley, B.A., North Texas State University; J.D., University of
Texas; Partner, Oppenheimer, Rosenberg, Kelleher & Wheatley, Inc., San Antonio,

Texas.
** Roland Castaneda, B.A., Texas A & I University; M.P.P., John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University; J.D., Harvard Law School; Associate, Op-

penheimer, Rosenberg, Kelleher &Wheatley, Inc., San Antonio, Texas.

89. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f (Supp. I, 1975).
90. Safe Drinking Water Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6454
(1974).
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Another basic policy finding made by Congress was that the majority of
the states had not adopted any drinking water standards, and among
those who did adopt them, no uniform set of standards existed. 91
Congress also found that numerous drinking water systems across the
country were unable to adequately collect and treat water, were unable
to hire or retain adequately trained personnel, were inadequately inspected and monitored, and generally tended to hide their shortcomings
behind a "wall of community apathy." 92 Finally, Congress took cognizance of a disturbing trend, indicated by recent studies, which revealed a
cessation in 1951 in the decrease in the average number of water-borne
outbreaks of communicable diseases and a subsequent slight increase in
their incidence. 8
THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT

The ultimate aim of the Safe Drinking Water Act is to establish
permanent national drinking water standards. Nonetheless, the Safe
Drinking Water Act requires the EPA Administrator to publish proposed Interim Primary Drinking Water Standards within 90 days after
enactment of the Act, and, within an additional 90 days, to promulgate
Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulations.94 Congress intended that
these Interim Regulations be established quickly, and anticipated that
they would, for the most part, be predicated on previously established
USPHS drinking water standards.95 The proposed regulations are to
take effect not later than one and a half years after their promulgation,
and the legislative history of this: section reveals that Congress intended
that public water systems not able to immediately comply with the
Interim Primary Drinking Water Standards be given at least 18 months
in which to do so.
As an initial step towards the adoption of permanent National Primary Drinking Water Standards, the Act requires that the Administrator contract with the National Academy of Sciences, or a similar agency,
to conduct a study to determine the appropriate maximum contaminant
levels for all substances to be permitted in drinking water so as to
"protect the health of persons from any known or anticipated adverse
91. 5 ErNvmoN. REP. 847 (Oct. 4, 1974).
92. Safe Drinking Water Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 645460 (1974).
93. Id. at 6457.
94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(a)(1) (Supp. I, 1975).
95. Safe Drinking Water Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6470
(1974).
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effects" of such contaminants.9 6 The National Academy of Sciences
has two years in which to make its report to Congress, and upon receipt
of this report, the EPA is required to publish regulations which embody
the recommended maximum contaminant levels for all measurable pollutants. These recommended maximum contaminant levels are goals
which are to "be set at levels which, in the Administrator's judgment
based on such report, no known or anticipated adverse effects on the
health of persons occur and which allows an adequate margin of
safety . .

.

Concomitant with the setting of recommended maximum contaminant levels, the Administrator must publish in the Federal Register
proposed revised national primary drinking water regulations, and within 180 days thereof promulgate such revised drinking water regulations."5 Public water systems will then have a period of 18 months in
which to comply with the revised primary drinking water regulations,
unless such public water system sought and was granted a variance or
exemption under the Act.19 In adopting these revised national primary
drinking water standards, the Administrator is under a duty to ensure
that the revised maximum contamination levels under the revised national primary drinking water standards are "as close to the recommended maximum contaminant levels. . as is feasible .
"...
100
Finally, the Act requires the Administrator to promulgate national
secondary drinking water regulations' 0 ' which are not federally enforceable. Thus, if the Administrator finds that a national secondary drinking water standard is being violated, he will be required to notify the
state in which the violation takes place and provide that state "such
advice and technical assistance. . . as may be appropriate to bring the
system into compliance with such regulation or Tequirement by the
earliest feasible time.' °
State Enforcement of NationalDrinking Water Standards
In drafting the Safe Drinking Water Act, Congress clearly intended a
96. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-1(e)(1) (Supp. 1, 1975).
97. Id. § 300g-l(b)(1)(A), (B).
98. Id. § 300g-l(b)(2).
99. Id. §§ 300g-4, 300g-5 (Supp. 1, 1975).
100. Id. § 300g-l(b)(3) (Supp. I, 1975).
The term "feasible" is understood to
mean, under the Act, "feasible with the use of the best technology, treatment techniques,
and other means, which the Administrator finds are generally available (taking cost into

consideration)."

Id.

101. Id. § 300g-l(e).
102. Id. § 300g-3(a)(1)(A)

(Supp. I, 1975).
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primary role of the states in assuming responsibility for implementing
and enforcing the National Drinking Water Standards. While the Act
assures the federal government a standard-setting role and further provides for federal back-up enforcement where needed,1 03 the statute
places upon those states determined by the Administrator to have complied with certain substantive conditions listed in section 1413(a), the
full primary enforcement responsibility under the Act. 04
Assumption of enforcement responsibilities by a state has extensive
value. For example, only those states with primary enforcement responsibility are given authority to grant variances and exemptions. In
addition, only these states are given the right to be accorded prior notice
of the commencement of a federal civil action against them, and only
such states are entitled to receive all necessary federal advice and
technical assistance needed to bring them into compliance with the Act.
Furthermore, under section 1443, only those states that have or will
assume primary enforcement responsibility qualify for funded grants to
implement public water system supervision programs. Indeed, because
of the extreme importance of the designation of authority to assume
primary enforcement -responsibility, Congress intended that the EPA not
deny 'any such -application unless there was evidence of a clear failure
by the state to meet the requirements of the section.10 5 The Act provides that a state's assumption of primary enforcement responsibility will
be revoked upon determination that the specific conditions are no longer
being met.
EPA's Enforcement Responsibilities
The EPA retains enforcement responsibility under the Act in all cases
where states fail to apply or qualify for assumption of primary enforce103. Id. §§ 300g-1, 300g-3 (Supp. I, 1975).
104. Id. § 300g-2(a) (1)-(5) (Supp. 1, 1975).

These substantive conditions include:

(1) Adoption by the State of drinking water regulations at least as stringent as
those of the National Primary Drinking Water Standards;
(2) Adoption and implementation by the State of procedures for enforcement of
such State regulations and, additionally, procedures for monitoring and inspecting
the State's water supplies;

(3) Demonstration of an intent to maintain an adequate record and report rendering system;
(4) Giving effect to a variance and exemption system which allows permits given
or issued under such a system to be no less stringent than similar exemptions or

variances possible under sections 1415 and 1416 of the Safe Drinking Water Act;

(5) Adoption by the State of an adequate plan to cover the imperilment of drinking water sources under emergency conditions.

105. Safe Drinking Water Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6474
(1974).
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ment responsibility, or where such enforcement responsibility has been
revoked due to failure to maintain the conditions of the grant of
authority. The Act establishes those conditions that will initiate federal
enforcement.106
If the EPA Administrator finds any violation of the Act occurring
within a state which has assumed primary enforcement responsibility, he
must first notify that state of the alleged violation. If such noncompliance
extends beyond a 30-day period, the Administrator is required to give
public notice of the alleged violation and request that the state report on
all remedial action within a 15-day period. If the alleged violation
continues for a 60-day period beyond -the date of notice, and the state
either fails to submit the requisite 15-day report or submits the report
but the Administrator, after considering the report, concludes that the
state is abusing its discretion, the Administrator is then authorized to
commence a civil action under Section 1414(b). It should also be
noted that the EPA may initiate civil actions where the Administrator is
requested to do so by the chief executive officer of the state or by the
state's drinking water agency. 10 7 In all those cases where a state has not
assumed enforcement responsibilities, the EPA Administrator may unilaterally initiate legal actions.
Another important feature of section 1414 is its requirement that
public water system operators notify their customers and the news media
at least every three months of any failure on their part to (1) comply
with any of the National Primary Drinking Water Standards, (2) meet
their monitoring requirements, or (3) notify their customers that they
have been granted either a variance or exemption from the National
Primary Drinking Water Standards by reason of their inability to meet
the National Primary Drinking Water Standards.'"
With regard to
these requirements, section 1414(c) provides for fines of up to $5,000
for any willful failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Act.
The notice requirement is intended to be an important feature of the
Act, and its purpose is to educate the populace concerning the public
water system's performance in relation to the goals and objectives of the
Safe Drinking Water Act. 0 The EPA Administrator has the task of
prescribing, by regulation, the form and manner for giving the requisite
106.
107.
108.
109.
(1974).

42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(a)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. I, 1975).
Id. § 300g-3(b)(2).
Id. § 300g-3(c).
Safe Drinking Water Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6476
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notice. Presumably, the Administrator will choose to differentiate between the section 1431 type of notice for "imminent and substantial
endangerment" violations and less serious violations under other portions of the Act." 0
The Act also allows the Administrator to hold public hearings whenever he makes a finding of "noncompliance""' with respect to a given
public water system which has assumed primary enforcement responsibilities. The purpose of such public hearings is to enhance public
awareness of the alleged problem, to gather information to determine
ways in which the system can be brought into compliance within the
earliest feasible time,"' and to explore means by which protection of the
public health during this period of noncompliance may be maximized.
Variancesand Exemptions Under the Safe Drinking Water Act
Perhaps some of the most important features of the Safe Drinking
Water Act are its provisions permitting states to grant variances from the
National Primary Drinking Water Standards and other provisions governing the exemptions of certain public water systems from full and/or
immediate compliance with the Act's mandatory drinking water standards.
There are two bases upon which a state, once having qualified to
assume primary enforcement responsibilities under the Act, may grant
variances to public water systems. So long as it will not result in an
unreasonable risk to health, a state may grant a variance to any public
water system which demonstrates to its satisfaction that due to particularly poor raw water characteristics, the water treatment facility will not
be able to meet the National Primary Drinking Water Standards. States
may also grant variances where they find that due to particularly good
water quality standards, specialized treatment techniques are "not necessary to protect the health of persons. .... 'Is
In the case of the first type of variance granted, the state must, within
one year, prescribe for that public water system a schedule for compliance with the National Primary Drinking Water Standards. In addition it must also prescribe an implementation schedule describing such
control measures as are required to insure compliance by that public
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 6477.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(a)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. I, 1975).
Id.§ 300g-3(f)(1).
42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-4(a)(1)(B) (Supp. I, 1975).
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water system with the National Primary Drinking Water Standards by
the end of the variance period. The statute provides that for each state
granted variance, the accompanying schedule of compliance will be
considered approved by the EPA Administrator unless the Administrator makes a finding that the state in question, "in a substantial number
Thus,
of instances, abused its discretion in granting variances .
this section envisions relatively little EPA review of state-granted variances except in those instances where it is deemed necessary to assure
effectuation of the Act's policies." 5 This section further provides that
prior to the time that any variance takes effect, public notice and an
opportunity for a public hearing on the proposed variance must be
provided." 6 The EPA must receive notice of each variance granted by
a state and the reasons for such a variance, including the factual findings
necessary to support such a decision.
Any state granted primary enforcement responsibility may exempt a
public water system from the National Primary Drinking Water Regulations where such water system was in operation at the time the requirement was imposed, or is unable to comply because of economic or other
compelling reasons. 1 7 As in the case of variances, the state is required
to prescribe, within one year of the date the exemption was granted, a
schedule of compliance and a delineation of those interim control measures which must be executed, "as expeditiously as possible," before
such an exemption will be granted." 8 Additionally, public water systems which have been granted exemptions from the Interim Drinking
Water Standards must, in any event, achieve full and final compliance
with the national standards no later than January 1, 1981; and an
exemption from the Revised Drinking Water Standards must culminate
in full compliance within seven years from the date of adoption of the
revised rules. As an incentive to those public water systems which opt
to integrate into a regional water system, Congress added an additional
two years to the exemption period, making the compliance deadline for
the Interim Drinking Water Standards January 1, 1983, and the final
compliance deadline for an exemption from the revised drinking water
standards nine years from the date of their adoption.
*."..,

114. Id. § 300g-4(g)(1).
115. Safe Drinking Water Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6479
(1974).
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-4(c) (Supp. I, 1975).

117. Id. § 300g-5(a). Systems put into effect after the effective date are expected
to comply with all Safe drinking Water Act requirements without exemptions.
118. Id. § 300g-5(b)(2) (A).
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The EPA is required to complete a comprehensive review of all
previously granted exemptions and a complete review of the policies
underlying administration of the exemption program within 18 months
after the effective date of the Interim Drinking Water Standards. The
findings of this comprehensive review will be studied and viewed in light
of the underlying congressional purpose, which was to add to the Safe
Drinking Water Act a substitute in the nature of an exemption program
for a federal construction grants program, so that hard-pressed communities would be given the time needed to finance required improvements in their water supply systems. The construction grants program
approach was rejected because of great uncertainty over the expected
costs of required system improvements. 1 9
PROTECTION OF UNDERGROUND WATER SOURCES

GeneralScheme of PartC of the Safe Drinking Water Act
A regulatory mechanism is set up by part C as additional protection
for our nation's underground drinking water sources, to ensure that such
underground sources of drinking water will not be degraded by actual or
potential underground injections of contaminants and thereby be rendered unfit for consumption. Like the provisions of the Act dealing
with surface drinking water sources, section 1422 establishes a federalstate system of creating and enforcing standards for the regulation of
underground injection of contaminants. Under this section, the EPA
must publish proposed regulations for state underground injection control programs and must promulgate guidelines for states to follow.
The term "underground injection" is defined as "the subsurface
implacement of fluids by well injection."'"2 In proposing regulation for
this operation, Congress expressed a concern about the significant hazards associated with an increasingly prevalent use of deep well injections
as a method of industrial and municipal waste disposal. Thus, one of
the major purposes of Part C of the Safe Drinking Water Act is to deal
with the increasing tendency of municipalities and industries to inject
sewage, sludge, and numerous wastes deep underground as a means of
their disposal.' 2 '
119. 5 ENVIRON. REP. 1298 (Dec. 20, 1974).
120. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h(c) (2) (Supp. I, 1975).
121. Safe Drinking Water Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6481
(1974).
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The guidelines to be promulgated by the EPA will eventually require
states to prohibit all unauthorized underground injection, i.e., all those
not authorized by permit, three years after passage of the Safe Drinking
Water Act. 122 These directives will also require permit applicants to
tender satisfactory proof to the state that the requested injections will not
endanger drinking water sources and will require states to adopt inspection, monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting systems in order to
effectuate compliance with that part of the Act. 128 In any event, these
regulations are not intended to have the effect of impeding or interfering
with the underground injection of brine or other fluids which are used in
connection with oil or natural gas production, or any other underground
injection which is an adjunct to the secondary or tertiary recovery of oil
or natural gas, unless "such requirements are essential to assure that
underground sources of drinking water will not be endangered by such

injections. '"124

The legislative history of the term "underground injections" indicates
that Congress intended that courts construe this term very broadly to
include "any contaminant which may be put below ground level and
which flows or moves, whether the contaminant is in semi-solid, liquid,
sludge, or any other form or state." 25 Indeed, Congress' only constraint was expressed as follows: "While Congress does not intend this
definition 0toapply to septic tanks or other individual residential waste
disposal systems, it does intend that the definition apply to a multiple
dwelling, community or regional system of injection of waste."' 26 From
this one can argue that Congress did not intend to limit "well injections"
to those by the "classical well injection method," but intended that the
definition include authority to regulate open pit, lagoons, man-made
structures or excavations, or any other means of "implacing" contaminants below ground.
It is important to recognize that Congress had every intention of
protecting not only "currently used sources of drinking water, but also
potential drinking water sources

. . .

which are not presently accessi-

ble for use as a community drinking water supply source.' 27 The
House Committee in its report made it quite clear that actual contamina122. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h(b)(1)(A) (Supp. I, 1975).
123. Id. § 300h(b)(1)(B).

124.
125.
(1974).
126.
127.

Id.§ 300h(b)(2).
Safe Drinking Water Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6483
Id. at 6483.
Id.at 6484.
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tion of a drinking water supply-the implacement of contaminants into
such supply which exceeded the maximum contaminant levels described
in the National Primary Drinking Water Standards-was "not a prerequisite either for the establishment of regulations or permit requirements
or for the enforcement thereof."'s In the Committee's opinion,
the definition would be met if injected material were not completely contained within the well, if it may hinder either a present
or potential drinking water source, and if it (or some form into
which it may be converted) may pose a threat to human
health
9
or render the water source unfit for human consumption. 12
Interim Regulation of UndergroundInjections
Section 1424 of the Act adds additional, though temporary, protection for underground sources of water where such sources emanate from
underground watersheds known as aquifers and constitute the sole or
principal supply of drinking water for a designated area. The method
of protection differs, depending on which one of two procedures is
selected in determining that an area has a sole or principal source
aquifer which, if contaminated, would create a significant health hazard.
This section was designed to deal with a limited problem which may
arise in the three-year period before state underground injection control
programs become effective under section 1421.10

More particularly,

section 1424(a) calls for the creation of a temporary program of
permitting new injection wells in a "designated" area only in those
instances where the Administrator has issued a permit authorizing such
an injection well. 8 ' An area lying above an aquifer may be "designated" if such aquifer serves as the sole or principal source of drinking
water for that area and, if contaminated, it would pose a significant
hazard to the public health. 82 In any event, any person may petition
the Administrator to have an area overlying an aquifer designated as an
area in which no new underground injection well may be operated until
an applicable underground injection control program becomes effective.
Congress intended that a person seeking a permit under section
1424(a) bear the burden of proving that his underground injection will
not contaminate the underground source of drinking water. 83 Despite
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
(1974).

Id. at 6484.
Id. at 6484.
Id. at 6486.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-3(b)(1) (Supp. I, 1975).
Id. § 300h-3(a).
Safe Drinking Water Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6487
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this onerous burden, however, the section does not define the phrase "a
significant hazard to public health" nor does it otherwise establish
standards or direct the Administrator to issue regulations defining applicable standards to be met by petitioners in discharging their burden of
proof. The legislative history sheds little light, if any, on the quantum
of "danger" which must exist before a proposed new well injection will
be deemed to create a significant hazard to the public health. Without
defining the standard, Congress did state that it fell "short of imminent
and substantial endangerment," which is the standard used in section
1431 of the Act to initiate administrative "emergency powers." A more
extensive discussion of the standards and methodology for determining
when a significant hazard to the public health exists is presented below.
SECTION 1424(e)-THE GONZALEZ AMENDMENT

The Senate passed its version of the Safe Drinking Water Act (S433) in June of 1973, without the Gonzalez Amendment. When the
House version of the Act went to the House floor for congressional
approval, however, Congressman Gonzalez sought to insert the follow-

ing:
(e) If the Administrator determines, on his own initiative or upon
petition, that an area has an aquifer which is the sole or principal
drinking water source for the area and which, if contaminated,
could create a significant hazard to public health, he shall publish
notice of that determination in the Federal Register. After the
publication of any such notice, no commitment for Federal financial assistance (through a grant, contract, loan guarantee, or otherwise) may be entered into for any project which the Administrator
determines
may contaminate such aquifer through a recharge
3 4
zone.1

Gonzalez stated the main purpose of his amendment as follows:
My amendment simply says where you have a community that is
dependent for its water source, its principal source or exclusive
source of drinking water in an aquifer-and this is true in the case
of my own hometown of San Antonio-then if the Administrator
discovers that Federal funds are going into any particular purposes
which would endanger that source of water, that he shall determine, and so does by publication in the Register, and after publication no commitments for Federal financial assistance would be
entered into unless
and until it is determined that no such danger13 5
ous impact exists.
134. 120 CoNo. REc. 10787 (1974) (Act 10804).
135. id. at 10787.
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There was hardly any discussion on the floor of the House concerning
this amendment and certainly none pertaining to the possible nationwide
impact of this amendment, nor any revealing of how the amendment
was to coalesce, if at all, into the policy and procedural mechanics of
section 1424 in view of the fact that this section was intended to be a
stop-gap measure which would terminate as soon as states assumed primary enforcement authority for conducting their own underground injection control programs. Finally, no discussion occurred by Congressman Gonzalez or anyone else concerning what, if anything, his amendment would add to existing congressional authority under the NEPA.
Apparently questions such as those above were not raised because
Representative Gonzalez stated that his amendment was aimed solely at
rectifying an alleged local abuse which deserved the narrowest scope of
congressional attention. Thus, in urging protection of underground
water sources, he cited as an example the case of his congressional
district which draws its water from an underground aquifer and stated:
"perhaps it [his district] is a very unique situation in the country
...
9116 In a further effort to characterize his amendment as a piece
of legislation with strictly localized effects, he stated that San Antonio,
Texas, which lies in his congressional district, had "developers who are
anxious to drill into the aquifer and develop their extensions willy-nilly
. . . " and he called these developers "unconscionable predators...
oblivious to the danger of the basic water supply in our community, and
. . . who are looking to Federal funds to carry out the projects
Thus, the legislative history fails to reveal any national
.. . .
purpose, although the wording of the amendment, contrary to its intent,
purports to apply nationwide.
Congress approved the Gonzalez Amendment by voice vote and
thereafter on record voted-and passed the main bill itself. At least a
half-dozen Texas Congressmen opposed the bill, including the other two
Congressmen representing portions of Bexar County, Congressman Kazen and Congressman Fisher."" Thereafter, the House version of the
bill (H.R. 13002) was accepted by the Senate along with the Gonzalez
Amendment. In the Senate, however, the Gonzalez Amendment itself
was amended to read as follows:
136. Id. at 10787.
137. Id. at 10787.

138. Since taking over Congressman Fisher's seat, duly elected Congressman Krueger
has also announced opposition to the Gonzalez Amendment. 120 CONG. Rac. 20220
(1974).
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(e) If the Administrator determines, on his own initiative or upon
petition, that an area has an aquifer which is the sole or principal
drinking water source for the area and which, if contaminated,
would create a significant hazard to public health, he shall publish
notice of that determination in the Federal Register. After the
publication of any such notice, no commitment for Federal financial assistance (through a grant, contract, loan guarantee, or otherwise) may be entered into for any project which the Administrator
determines may contaminate such aquifer through a recharge zone
so as to create a significant hazard to public health, but a commit-.
ment for federal financial assistance may, if authorized under another provision of law, be entered into to plan or design the project to assure that it will not so contaminatethe aquifer.13 9
Apparently, the Senate altered the Gonzalez Amendment in very
significant ways. It substituted the word "would" in the first sentence
of section 1424(e) for the word "could." The Senate also added a
significant segment to the last sentence of the amendment which has the
effect of completely exempting certain federal funds from the reach of
section 1424(e) if the intended use of such funds is to ensure that the
relevant project will be planned and designed to avoid contaminating
such aquifer. On November 26, 1974, the Gonzalez Amendment, as
amended, was adopted by the Senate, and the entire bill was returned to
the House and adopted by the House on December 3, 1974.
The Scope and Operationof the Amendment
Congressman Gonzalez was under the impression that his district
represented a "unique" situation. Yet, it is known that groundwater
constitutes 2,000 to 3,000 times the amount of water represented by all
surface water combined; and it is further estimated that groundwater
represents 97 percent of all fresh water supplies in the United States
upon which over 100 million Americans rely for some portion of their
drinking water.14 0 The exact amount of this underground water found
in aquifers may yet be undetermined, though it is known, for example,
that Texas itself has approximately six aquifers. The Edwards Aquifer,
and the surface land which contributes recharge to it, alone covers several million acres and spans over 11 counties in Texas. The Edwards
Aquifer was the subject of the Gonzalez Amendment.
Thus, potentially hundreds of communities within this eleven-county
area face the possibility of being denied federal financial assistance for a
139. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-3(e) (Supp. I, 1975) (emphasis added).
140. See generally, EPA, NATIONAL SAFE DRINaNo WATER STTOY (1975).
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score of federal projects upon the triggering of section 1424(a) or
section 1424(e). In fact, local environmental groups in the San Antonio metropolitan area have already filed a section 1424(e) determination petition with the EPA Administrator, seeking to have the Edwards
Aquifer designated a sole or principal source of drinking water for the
City of San Antonio. The concern most often expressed by such groups
is that the supply of drinking water for the City of San Antonio will
become unfit for use as the pace of development over the Edwards
Aquifer quickens.
A close analysis of the amendment reveals how such a determination
is to be made. First, the amendment's procedure is initiated unilaterally
by the EPA Administrator, or upon the filing of a petition by an
interested party. This condition being met, the Administrator must
then determine if an area has: (1) an aquifer, (2) which is the sole or
principal water source for the area, (3) and which, if contaminated,
would create a significant hazard to the public health.
Where the facts so warrant, and the Administrator makes the
requested determination, he must publish notice of that determination in
the Federal Register. Upon publication of such notice, no federal
financial assistance may be offered for any project which the Administrator subsequently determines may contaminate such aquifer through a
recharge zone so as to create a significant hazard to public health. The
Gonzalez Amendment provides, however, that federal funds may be
procured if they are to be used to plan or design the project to assure
that it will not contaminate the aquifer.
How this amendment is to operate in practice is difficult, if not
impossible, to discern. Congress' shortcomings or oversights in passing
an amendment fraught with definitional gaps and without the slightest
indication as to how it is to operate, not only within the context of the
entire bill, but also within a constitutional context, are apparent.
Despite what ambiguities may now exist in the amendment itself, the
EPA must soon decide whether a 1424(e) determination is warranted
in the case of the Edwards Aquifer, by virtue of ,the fact that a 1424(e)
petition was filed shortly after enactment of the Safe Drinking Water
Act on behalf of the Sierra Club, the League Of Women Voters, and
Citizens for a Better Environment of the City of San Antonio. Notice
of the receipt of this petition was published in the Federal Register on
March 6, 1975.141

This notice stated that data and references to rele-

141. 40 Fed. Reg. 10514 (1975).
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vant sources of information would be welcome, and that if a significant
public interest in this matter became apparent, the EPA would consider
holding a public hearing. Such a hearing was deemed necessary and
was held in San Antonio, Texas, on June 4, 1975. On that date over
50 persons from all levels of government and the private sector offered
testimony concerning all -aspects of the question of whether the Edwards
Aquifer area should be "determined", pursuant to the amendment, to
be a sole or principal drinking water source for the area which, if contaminated, would create a significant hazard to the public health.
Perhaps the threshold question in the minds of most participants, as
well as the hearing examiners at the June 4, 1975, hearing was the
question of whether or not the EPA Administrator had the discretion of
not making a "determination" once all the information is accumulated.
In other words, was there any state of affairs in which EPA would not
be obligated to make a section 1424(e) determination under the Edwards petition?
To answer this question, the language of section 1424(e) should be
compared with that of section 1424(a), which states that the Administrator "may" designate an area upon determining that the area has an
aquifer which, if contaminated, would create a significant hazard to
public health. Section 1424(e) is couched in similar terms. It reads
that "if" the Administrator makes a determination, such as the one
described in section 1424(a), he shall publish notice of that determination in the Federal Register and thereafter no commitment for federal
financial assistance may be entered into for any project if the Administrator determines such project may contaminate the aquifer through a
recharge zone.
Obviously, from the amendment's language the Administrator is imbued with a "threshold" level of discretion in that he must, at some
point, determine whether the statute is to apply at all in a given factual
situation. Thus, the Administrator must ascertain that (1) an area has
an aquifer, (2) that such aquifer is the sole or principalwater source for
that area, (3) that if contaminated, the development project causing
such contamination is being funded by federal financial sources, and
(4) that such contamination would create (5) a significant hazard to
the public health.
There are quite a number of factors involved in the Administrator's
"threshold determination" under section 1424(e), and in the absence of
any one of these factors the agency action described as a section
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1424(e) "determination" will be precluded.

Restated, these factors

determine the threshold responsibility below which agency discretion
does exist and is to be exercised whenever the Administrator attempts to

ascertain whether a "determination" is justified. Support for this view
of agency "threshold discretion" can be drawn from those cases which
deal with the right of agencies to make threshold determinations in
deciding whether or not to file environmental impact statements under
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.142 Typical of these is
the case of Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger.143 This action was a suit to

enjoin the General Services Administration (GSA) from constructing a
federal office building in downtown Mobile, Alabama. The sole basis

for appeal of the trial court judgment against the plaintiffs was the
alleged failure on the part of GSA to file a detailed environmental

impact statement as required of all federal agencies with regard to any
proposed major federal actions which significantly affected the quality
44
of the human environment.1
The GSA stipulated that no environmental impact statement had been
filed, but took the position that none was needed because their federal
action would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment. In its decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recognized that federal agencies had a right to make a discretionary
threshold determination as to whether or not their project constituted

a major federal project which significantly affected the environment and,
therefore, had a concomitant right to determine whether or not they

were under a compulsion to file a environmental impact statement in
any given case. The court, however, rendered its decision on the
narrower issue of what constituted a proper standard for judicial review
of such agency threshold discretion. The appellate court held that the

lower court erred when it ruled that GSA's threshold determination that
142. See, e.g., Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974);
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974);
Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. U.S. Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029
(D.C. Cir. 1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); Jones
v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495
(4th Cir. 1973); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973);
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst,
471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1974); Jones v. U.S. Dept.
HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. La. 1974); Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex.
197,4).
143. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
144. Id. at 464. See generally, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Supp. 1975).
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its project would not significantly affect the quality of the environment
could not be overturned except upon a showing that it was arbitrary or
capricious, or constituted an abuse of discretion. Instead, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that a more relaxed standard of
"reasonableness" of the agency decision was more appropriate in light
of
the congressional policy of evaluating all environmental projects to the
14 5
fullest extent possible.
Given the similarity of the NEPA language construed by the federal
court in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger and that found in the Safe
Drinking Water Act, one can expect that the present position of the
EPA Administrator under section 1424(e) will be deemed to be similar
in many respects to that position held by agency heads under the NEPA,
whenever they must determine whether or not their agency actions
require the filing of a detailed environmental impact statement. Substantively, the question must be asked, what exactly are the threshold
sub-determinations that must be made by the Administrator under a
section 1424(e) "threshold determination"? The answer is not as clear
as it might appear at first glance.
Heard quite frequently at the EPA hearing on the Edwards petition in
San Antonio on June 4, 1975, was the viewpoint that once the EPA
Administrator merely decided that the Edwards Aquifer served as the
sole or principal drinking water source for the City of San Antonio,
Texas, that he would thereafter, of necessity, have to publish notice of
such a determination in the Federal Register, subsequent to that event
all commitments of federal financial assistance would be contingent
upon approval by the EPA that the particular project under review
would not contaminate the aquifer so as to create a significant hazard to
the public health. Such a viewpoint, of course, assumes the further
elements necessary to be found by the EPA, i.e., that contamination will
occur, and, if such contamination occurs, a significant health hazard
would result. Such tautological reasoning eliminates any necessity for
the EPA Administrator to investigate facts sufficient to determine that
such contamination presently exists, or even if it does exist, that such
contamination has any causal relation to any present or potential public
health hazard.
The EPA will be unable to base its "threshold determinations" under
section 1424(e) on such spurious grounds. In the writers' opinion, the
development of case law under environmental statutes similar to the Safe
145. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Drinking Water Act reflects a strong trend and growing concern by our
courts to ensure that environmental decisions made by the EPA are
based on the most stringent of methodological grounds. In most of the
cases reviewed by the writers, the EPA was required to empirically
demonstrate the causal relationships between facts alleged and the causes and effects alleged to follow. 14 6 Thus, in the writers' opinion, before
the Administrator can make a valid section 1424(e) determination, he
will be required not only to show that an aquifer serves as a sole or
principal drinking water source for a given area, but also that the
various threshold sub-determinations discussed above have been met.
Among other things, such sub-determinations must show that the aquifer
is now contaminated or that the likelihood of its becoming contaminated
has been raised to the level of certainty. The record will also have to
show that the nature and magnitude of such contamination will create a
direct, provable, and significant hazard to the health of a significant
portion of the general public residing in such area. In -the absence of
such a factual chain of empirical evidence demonstrating a cause and
effect relationship between the harm and risk perceived and the actual
degree of damage created, it is the writers' opinion that the Administrator's determination will be susceptible to a successful legal challenge.
The fact that courts are imposing on the EPA increasingly rigorous
standards of rationality and empirical proof in its decision-making
process, is best illustrated by the case of Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,' 47 which
dealt with the section of the Clean Air Act permitting the EPA Administrator to:
[c]ontrol or prohibit the manufacture, introduction into commerce, offering for sale, or sale of any fuel or fuel additive for
use in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine (A) if any emission
products of such fuel or fuel additives will endanger the public
health or welfare ....
In this case the plaintiffs challenged the EPA's authority to issue
regulations pursuant to the above quoted statutory provision on the
grounds that the EPA incorrectly interpreted the provision and therefore
used an incorrect legal standard when it made the initial threshold
determinations upon which the EPA based the exercise of its right to
promulgate regulations. The plaintiffs also argued that the evidence,
146. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 ERC 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974).
147. 7 ERC 1353, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
148. Id. at 1361, 1363.
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upon which the EPA sought to base its initial threshold determination,
did not support the EPA's decision and at best was "speculative and
inconclusive." The appellate court agreed with both contentions of the
plaintiff. The court rejected the EPA's argument that the statutory
standard of "will endanger the public health" was a delegation of a
"quasi-legislative" power to the EPA Administrator and not a requirement that he reach a reasoned determination based solely on the available scientific and medical data. The court pointed out that the statute
sets forth a strict standard of factual proof that must establish a causal
connection between lead emissions and the resulting harm. In the
absence of scientifically proven causation, the EPA's decision can only
be arbitrary and capricious." 9
The Ethyl case which dealt with but one threshold sub-determination,
i.e., that lead emission products will endanger the public health, makes
it clear that the EPA in exercising its authority under section 1424(e)
will have to construct a rigorous methodological basis for at least three
threshold sub-determinations under that provision. First, the EPA will
have to determine that an area has an aquifer which is the sole or
principal drinking water source for that area. A second determination
must be whether the aquifer is contaminated at present or with a high
degree of probability is about to become contaminated, taking into
account such factors as the rate of pollution-creating development over
the aquifer balanced against the aggregate pollution abatement measures
being implemented by various governmental bodies in that area. Third,
the EPA will have to prove that where the aquifer is or is about to
become contaminated, that such contamination will create a significant
hazard to the public health.
The problem with making sub-determinations of this nature under
the Gonzalez Amendment is that the amendment does not define what
a sole or principal drinking water source is, nor what constitutes contamination. The amendment does not even define a legal standard for
judging the quantum of proof needed to show that such contamination
would create the type of harm which constitutes a "significant hazard"
under section 1424(e). The amendment also does not define what is
meant by "the public health." In addition to these shortcomings, the
Gonzalez Amendment does not grant to the EPA the authority to define
the substantive meaning of these terms by rule or regulation. Given this
state of affairs and the fact that the string of threshold sub-determina149. Id. at 1376.
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tions which will be required under the Gonzalez Amendment must meet
minimal standards of rationality, one wonders how the EPA will be able
to make a determination under 1424(e), at least until regulations are
promulgated which clarify the definitional yardsticks to be used by the
EPA in giving meaning to these terms. It should also be pointed out
that section 1424(e) does not even require the Administrator to hold
hearings in making determinations under this provision, nor is he
required to even base his decision on a factual record.
The seriousness of the definitional problems can be illustrated by the
ambiguity of meaning of the phrase "if contaminated." A question is
raised as to whether the term means that the Administrator must determine that the aquifer is now contaminated, or whether it means that the
probability that it will become contaminated has reached a high level of
certainty. This latter view draws some support from the author of the
amendment. Congressman Gonzalez, in his prepared statement read
during the Edwards petition hearing, stated as follows:
The Safe Drinking Water Act, as a general proposition, recognizes
and affirms that the provision of drinking water, and the assurance
of its quality, is primarily the task of state and local government.
But the Act also recognizes that where state and local government
has been unable or unwilling to perform this task adequately, and
where the public health and safety are imperiled as a result, the
Federalgovernment may act.1"'
It is likely that Congressman Gonzalez was saying that a state of
actual or near actual contamination would have to exist before a section
1424(e) determination could be made. To say otherwise would only
mean that the EPA Administrator would be given license to deal in
ephemeral presumptions. This is to say that one would have to presume
a condition of contamination which in reality does not exist. To do this,
however, is to commit the same error that the EPA committed in the
Ethyl case where the agency omitted a "link" in the chain of causal
evidence to reach the conclusion it did, and thereby took an "arbitrary
jump in its logic to reach the conclusion"-such jump thus causing its
decision to be both "arbitrary and capricious" and a "clear error of
151
judgment."'
A second problem encountered with this very same phrase is that the
word "contamination" is nowhere defined in Section 1424 or in Part C
150. Id. at 1368 (emphasis added). See also South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504
F.2d 646 (lst Cir. 1974).
151. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 ERC 1353, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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of the Safe Drinking Water Act. A more careful approach to the
drafting of this amendment surely would havo provided its precise
meaning or related the meaning of this word in section 1424(e) more
directly to the National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, to the
effect that contaminant levels in excess of the National Primary Drinking
Water Standards constituted "contamination" 'for purposes of section
1424(e). This was not done.
The next major problem faced by the Administrator is that of
showing -that whatever contamination actually exists in the aquifer, or is
likely to exist in light of local ,and state failure to protect the waters from
.pollution, is of such nature and magnitude as to be certain that it will
create a significant hazard to the public health." 2 Whether the EPA
will choose to follow as rigorous a methodology as that set out in the
Ethyl case in making its determination under the Safe Drinking Water
Act remains to be seen. If the Administrator does so choose, he will
have to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the present or
expected levels of contamination of the Edwards Aquifer are of such
nature and magnitude as to create a significant likelihood of producing
the level of public harm specified by the statute.
It is extremely important to note that as originally proposed, the
Gonzalez Amendment used a "could create" standard. This language
was later amended to read "would create," and such language was
adopted by both Houses of Congress. It is submitted that the substitution of the word "would" for "could" was intended by Congress to
signify a very significant difference in the legal standard to be employed by the EPA in determining whether or not a significant hazard
existed. It will be noted that the word "could" expresses a contingency
that might be possible, whereas the word "would" expresses a greater certainty in the occurrence of a given event, or it may even be read to mean
that it states a presumption that the event will occur.
Thus, two things are clear under the Ethyl case: first, the agency will
have to show that the contamination under investigation is or will be the
cause of a significant health hazard to the public at large; second, some
level of contamination must presently exist. Section 1424(a) requires
the Administrator to provide interested persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments in support of or against a given
petition. Where the EPA chooses to adopt this procedure in conducting
a section 1424(e) determination-as in the case of the Edwards Peti152. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-3 (Supp. I, 1975).
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tion-then the EPA should evaluate its duties under the Gonzalez
Amendment, not as a delegation of congressional responsibility, but
rather as a mandate to base its threshold determinations on empirical
facts and data rather than policy mandate.
One further definitional constraint in the phrase "if contaminated"
should be discussed. A strong and credible argument can be made to
the effect that a section 1424(e) determination was intended by Congress to apply only to special situations as described on the House floor
and at the EPA hearings by Congressman Gonzalez: those situations
where federal agencies were lending financial support to development
projects which in turn began actually endangering the waters of an
aquifer.1"' Congressman Gonzalez framed the operation of his amendment in such a manner that the causal origin of a section 1424(e) type
of contamination would be one whose roots emanated from federal
financial coffers. More simply, the Congress did not intend to give the
EPA the authority to make 'a section 1424(e) type of determination
where privately-financed development was causing contamination of the
aquifer or was accounting for degradation of the drinking water. Such
pollution presumably would be subject to control by section 1424(a)
and not by section 1424(e). Rather, what Congressman Gonzalez was
apparently trying to accomplish was to curtail private development
which was being federally financed and which, by virtue of such assistance, was escaping regulation under section 1424(a) of the Act, or
under the state regulatory scheme as provided by various provisions in
the main bill.
Another point to consider in deciding whether or not section 1424(e)
was intended to apply to situations other than federally financed developments causing pollution of aquifers is the fact that section 1424(a) is
a temporary interim regulatory mechanism which for any given state
terminates "on the date on which the applicable underground injection
control program covering such area takes effect
..",
.
While
section 1424(a) definitely is a temporary program, the status of section
1424(e) is unclear. It is true, unlike section 1424(a), Congress did
not expressly limit the operation of section 1424(e) to a specified period
of time, but section 1424(e) does fall, after all, within the section
entitled "Interim Regulation of Underground Injections."
On the one hand, if section 1424(e) does apply only to "unique
situations" where federally assisted projects are causing the contamina153. Statement of Henry B. Gonzalez to EPA, San Antonio, Texas, June 4, 1975.
154. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-3(a) (Supp. I, 1975).
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tion of an entire aquifer and which projects, for whatever reason, are
escaping regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act's main provisions, it is highly plausible that Congress intended it to be a permanent
feature of the Safe Drinking Water Act to provide backup support
which the bill's main provisions were failing to provide. On the other
hand, if section 1424(e) has no more utility than section 1424(a), and
no more utility than the main enforcement provisions of the bill, it is
difficult to see why it should be upgraded by agency fiat to the status of
being a permanent provision in light of its place within the bill, its scant
legislative history, and its duplication of section 1424(a). It is the
writers' view that one sub-determination inherent in section 1424(e)
should be that the EPA must prove that the cause of contamination of
the Edwards Aquifer is being promoted through the provision of federal
financial assistance, and that failing to show this, no section 1424(e)
determination can be made.
The next consideration is a scrutiny of the meaning of the phrase
"significant hazard" found in section 1424(e). As this phrase is'
also
of
that
history
found in section 1424(a), we may look to the legislative
section to see how the committee intended it to be construed. According to the committee report, a significant hazard to the public health is a
hazard "short of imminent and substantial endangerment."' 1 5 In discussing the phrase "imminent and substantial endangerment," found in
section 1431 of the Act, the House report makes it clear that in using
this phrase the committee did not intend the EPA administrative authority to
be used when the system of regulatory -authorities provided elsewhere in the bill could be used adequately to protect the public
health. Nor is the emergency authority to be used in cases where
the risk of harm is remote in time, completely speculative in nature, or de minimis in degree .... 1I
The test for a significant hazard is not, however, equivalent to that
used to measure an imminent and substantial endangerment. Thus, the
degree of harm needed to trigger section 1424(e) is less harm than that
needed for the section 1431 test of endangerment, and presumably, it is
greater than the harm produced by level of contamination equal to or
less than those described by the maximum contaminant levels and
published as part of the National Primary Drinking Water Standards.
155. Safe Drinking Water Act, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1185, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6486
(1974).
156. Id. at 6487-88.
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The reason one can assume that contaminant levels under section
1424(e) can exceed the National Primary Drinking Water Standards
contaminant levels without creating a significant hazard to the public
health is the fact that the Safe Drinking Water Act itself creates an
elaborate system of variances and exemptions from National Primary
Drinking Water Standards. This system suggests that the levels of
contamination permitted to escape total prohibition under the Act can
be used as a bench mark to demarcate those contaminant levels in excess
of the National Primary Drinking Water Standards which admittedly
constitute hazards, but which hazards are not unreasonable. 5 7 In other
words, a significant hazard is one which can be expected to at least
equal or approximate the contaminant level for a given contaminant in
excess of the highest existing variance or exemption approved under
sections 1415 or 1416 of the Safe Drinking Water Act.
Interestingly, Congressman Gonzalez propounded a strikingly novel
definition of what constitutes a "significant hazard" under section
1424(e) at the San Antonio hearing on the Edwards Petition. There
he stated:
The problem for the Environmental ,Protection Agency is to define what constitutes a hazard, under terms of this law.
I believe that the law should be interpreted in this way: the danger point is reached when any project or combination of projects
threaten to degrade the water in the aquifer to the point that it
would require further treatment than is now provided, in order.
to make the water safe for human consumption and other public
uses. In short, nothing should be allowed to degrade the water
to the point where San Antonio and other communities dependent
on the Edwards Aquifer would have to install water
treatment
1 58
plants that are any more advanced than are now used.
Congressman Gonzalez' statements reveal their utter incompatibility
with the provisions and spirit of the Safe Drinking Water Act. The
standard he advocates, simply put, is one which bears no relationship
whatsoever to medical and scientific criteria, i.e., to what "harm" normally signifies to the average person, and, therefore, his standard bears
no rational relationship to the danger sought to be avoided.
Finally, consideration should be given to the term "public health."
It should be noted that this term is nowhere defined in section
157. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300g-4(a) (1) (A), 300g-5(a)(3) (Supp. I, 1975).
158. Statement of Henry B. Gonzalez to the EPA, San Antonio, Texas, June 4, 1975
(emphasis added).
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1424(e) nor in the Act itself; yet, it constitutes another sub-determination that the EPA must make prior to making a section 1424(e)
determination. The significance of this term can be quite important,
since a simple health hazard is something less than a hazard to the
"public health." If contamination creates something less than a "public
hazard," though all other criteria under section 1424(e) would be
satisfied, the Administrator may still not justify blanketing a multi-million acre area with a designation calculated to force all federal financial
assistance to cease by virtue of such determination. Although it is
unclear what the phrase "public health" means in the Gonzalez Amendment, one might reasonably assume that the pollution factor must affect
a significant portion of the population drawing its water from the
aquifer before a situation constitutes a hazard to the "public health."
This definitional issue was present in the Ethyl case, where the court
pointed out that since Congress was considering the Clean Air Act
simultaneously with the Occupational Safety & Health Act, it therefore
could have intended
that a health hazard that affected only one or a few occupational
groups should be dealt with as an occupational hazard, without
subjecting the entire 213 million of the American general public
to regulations when only a small percentage needed protection,
and that protection could be afforded by actions less widespread
in their effect. 5"
The same reasoning could easily apply to the Gonzalez Amendment.
Apparently the main thrust of the Gonzalez Amendment is simply to
prevent federal agencies from promoting a project which can harm the
underground drinking water source of an area, and that a case-by-case
project review will be necessary in order to determine which projects do
and which do not contaminate such aquifer so as to create a significant
hazard to the public health. The term "project" will have to be defined
by the courts or by agency regulation to specify certain criteria, such as
the type of facility and the effect of the location. EPA project review
procedures will also have to be implemented, but it is not yet clear
whether each project will have to bear the burden of proving that it is a
safe project.
The question that must be asked, however, is what will this review
process add to the NEPA's own environmental impact statement (EIS)
process already in affect, or how will it detract from such a review
process? Since the EPA already has an EIS review process, one can
159. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 ERC 1353, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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assume that the EPA will either re-adapt this project review procedure to
the section 1424(e) project review process or create an entirely separate
project review procedure. It is uncertain, however, that the EPA will
take upon itself the task of monitoring each and every project which
may be thought to constitute a danger to a given aquifer, or whether it
will, as under the NEPA, defer to federal agencies and permit them to
make the type of initial threshold determinations discussed herein. This
would have the benefit of imposing the burden on the involved federal
agencies to prove that their projects were not of the type that would
contaminate an aquifer, instead of placing the burden on the EPA to
show that a given federal action will cause such contamination. This
distinction is critical because it would mean that under section 1424(e),
the EPA would bear the burden of proof on the initial threshold
determination that leads to the designation of an entire area; once a
"determination" is made, the burden will then rest on the respective
federal agencies.
Support for this view is found in the legislative history recorded on
the House floor and made prior to the passage of the Gonzalez Amendment. Congressman Gonzalez stated that once a determination is
made, and is so made by publication in the Federal Register, then after
such publication no commitment for federal financial assistance Can be
entered into unless and until it is determined that no dangerous impact
exists. 1 10 On the other hand, since section 1424(e) nowhere directly
ties into the NEPA, abdication by the EPA of the project review
procedure may be open to attack as being in derogation of the congressional will and a delegation of its responsibilities to federal agencies not
intended to be imbued with project review discretion. But if the EPA
were to be made responsible itself for a project-by-project review, a
massive burden on the EPA under section 1424(e)'s project review
provision would thereby result. Regardless of who ultimately bears
responsibility for the project review aspect of section 1424(e), it is clear
that the EPA will at some point have to issue regulations defining the
applicable thresholds for project review-something equivalent, in effect, to the term "major actions" in the NEPA; otherwise, the task will
be too massive even for the EPA.
CONCLUSION

In view of the fact that the Edwards designation petition has been
filed under section 1424(e), the EPA now must decide whether to
160. Statement of Henry B. Gonzalez to the EPA, San Antonio, Texas, June 4, 1975.
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designate the multi-million acre tract of land -overlying the Edwards
Aquifer under section 1424(e) or to take some other more reasonable
action that is correlative to the objectives of the Safe Drinking Water
Act. The EPA Administrator may exercise one of three options:
(1) take no action on the Edwards petition for determination;
(2) deny the Edwards petition and thereby not designate the Edwards
Aquifer under section 1424(e); or (3) make a determination under the
Edwards petition as to some or all of the Edwards Aquifer.
In reality, the first option does not represent a viable alternative since
the EPA Administrator must take some action under section 1424(e)
when a petition for determination is submitted; that is, he must either
designate or not designate. In the writers' opinion, the EPA must
create some kind of record reflecting a reasoned judgment which supports its decision to designate or not designate a given area under the
Gonzalez Amendment.
The second option available to the EPA is to formally deny the
Edwards petition and thus decline to make a section 1424(e) determination at all. If the EPA took such an action, it could be expected to
justify its decision on three general grounds. First, the EPA could
decide that state and local pollution control programs offer sufficiently
stringent safeguards and standards to prevent levels of contamination
which can create a significant hazard to the public health. The EPA
could determine that the Texas Water Quality Board Order 75-0128206 and/or other applicable national, county, or local water quality
control programs, such as those currently being formulated by the City
of San Antonio, are adequately preventing contamination of the Edwards Aquifer and its sensitive areas to the point where the threat
of a significant hazard to the public health has been reduced to a de
minimis level or a level approaching pure speculation.
The second ground for denying the Edwards petition, in whole or in
part, could be based on deferral to the expressed desires of state and
local interest which, in the case of the Edwards petition, strongly
advocated no federal intervention unless and until state and local regulatory mechanisms failed in their enforcement responsibilities. At the
Edwards petition hearing in San Antonio, Texas, most of the scheduled
speakers spoke in opposition to the EPA's exercise of authority under
the Gonzalez Amendment, and the vast majority of those officials
present expressed a strong belief that state and local agencies were
.161. Tex. Water Quality Bd. Order No. 7.5-0128-20 (1975).
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sufficiently equipped and motivated to regulate sources of pollution that
might spread in the Edwards Aquifer. It is reasonable to expect that
the EPA should be seeking opportunities to work with state and local
pollution control agencies, since it is they whom the EPA will rely upon
in another context to enforce the main provisions of the Safe Drinking
Act.
Finally, the EPA may decide not to make a determination under
section 1424(e) simply because the available hydrologic, scientific, and
medical evidence will not support the conclusion that the nature and
magnitude of the contamination presently existing, or currently threatening the aquifer, will sufficiently endanger the public health, so as to
pose a significant hazard to the public health.
The third option the EPA may exercise is that of making a "determination" under section 1424(e) that the Edwards Aquifer is the sole or
principal source of drinking water supply which is now contaminated or
is threatened with contamination of such nature and magnitude as to
constitute a significant hazard to the public health. It is submitted that
if the EPA makes the section 1424(e) determination under the Edwards petition, the EPA should: (1) not designate the entire area
covered by the Edwards Aquifer but rather should designate only the
upper basin above the Balcones Fault Line; (2) establish zones within
boundaries of such aquifer ranked on the basis of pollution potential; (3) establish point source and non-point source standards; (4)
establish threshold review procedures so that each federally assisted
project lying over the aquifer will not have to be subjected to the EPA's
section 1424(e) review process; (5) continue to review all "major
federal actions" through the NEPA process; and (6) establish review
procedures of all NPDWS applications.
In conclusion, it is the writers' belief that selection by the EPA of the
second option will achieve the greatest number of the Safe Drinking
Water Act's main objectives. It will certainly stimulate and nurture
local control and responsibility for enforcement of the National Primary
Drinking Water Standards which in turn will improve the operation and
success of such local efforts. This strategy is consistent with the Safe
Drinking Water Act's policy of increasing public reliance on state and
local pollution control agencies and will permit the protection of a single
city's drinking water supply to be closely protected by means which cast
a less widespread and drastic effect upon an entire multi-county population. It would provide a remedy which. is more closely tailored to the
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specific danger sought to be eliminated, rather than impose on an entire
multi-county area a federal edict designed to truncate the flow of federal
financial assistance to all activities within that area, presumably until
such time as the EPA can draft and promulgate regulations which
define the scope and substance of such review procedure.
At this stage in the implementation of the Safe Drinking Water Act,
the most prudent policy the EPA can pursue is that of working as
closely as possible with state and local agencies so as to insure that the
EPA will not lose the working rapport necessary to make the main
provisions of the bill of the Safe Drinking Water Act manageable. The
Edwards petition represents an important turning point in the develop-,
ment of an EPA policy under section 1424(e). It is important not only
because it will set a precedent which will shape how the EPA interprets
section 1424(e)'s provisions, but it will also serve as an extremely
important indicator as to whether or not the EPA will abide by the
congressional will, expressed in various provisions of the Safe Drinking
Water Act as well as in its legislative history, that the federal government encourage maximum state initiative and responsibility with respect
to carrying out all of the provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act.
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